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An important decision has been rendered in the case of Brad-
ley et a. v. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. et al., 68 Fed. Rep. 968, by
Ross, J., of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia. This was a suit in equity to enjoin the execution of a deed
of certain land of the complainant, given by the collector of the
defendant irrigation district under a sale to satisfy a delinquent
assessment against the said property, levied under the provisions
of the so-called "Wright Act" of the State of California (St. 1887,
p. 29; St. 1889, pp. 15-18, 212, 213; St. 1891, pp. 53, 142, 145, 147,
244), providing for the organization and existence of irrigation
districts, and to obtain a decree adjudging the proceedings under
that legislation void and of no effect.
The regularity of the proceedings under the act was not ques-
tioned but the ground of the suit was the alleged unconstitution-
ality of the Wright Act itself, it being contended that it con-
flicted with certain provisions of the Constitutien of the State of
California and also with that provision of the Constitution of the
United States which declares that no person shall be deprived of
his property without due process of law, and moreover that the
act provided for the taking of private property for private use.
The defendant demurred on the ground that similar objections
had been raised to this legislation in other cases and that the
validity of the Wright Act had been determined by the Supreme
Court of California (Irri. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360; Irri.
Dist. v. DeLaPPe, 79 Cal. 352. In re. Madera Irri. Dist., 92 Cal.
296). Judge Ross holds that, "While the decisions of that Court
in those, as well as in all other cases are justly entitled to great
respect, this Court is not at liberty to decline to exercise its own
independent judgment in determining whether alty State legisla-
tion violates a provision of the Constitution of the United States."
The solution of these questions must be sought not in the decisions
of a single State tribunal but in the general principles common to
our courts (0/cott v. Supervisors, i 6 Wall. 678). Nor does a leg-
islative declaration that a use is a public use necessarily make it
so (Cooley, Const. Lim., 5 th Ed., p. 666, and cases cited). The
character of a use is not to be tested by the number of persons
who enjoy it, and no man's property can be taken from him with-
out his consent and given to individuals for their own use, no
matter how numerous they may be, nor can it be taken on the
mere ground that the public good wouldbe thereby advanced. A
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public use implies a possession, occupation, and enjoyment of
the land by the public at large, and the same objection is valid
in this case as in Cumzings v. Peters, 56 Cal. 593, "that the use
of the water is limited to specific individuals" (i. e., those hold-
ing land in the irrigation district) "and the interest of the public
is nothing more than that indirect and collateral benefit that it
derives for every improvement of a useful character that is made
in the State."
A fatal objection to the maintenance of the legislation under
the right of eminent domain, is that, if it is to be regarded as
undertaken- by the public primarily as a matter of public con-
cern, the assessment upon the land owners must be limited to the
benefits imparted, which is not the case with this statute (Wurtz
v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 613; Tide-water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J.
Eq. 527). If the act is to be maintained at all it must be under
the power of assessment for local improvements, but there is no
reason why this power more than any other can be exercised
without "due process of law." And as the whole scheme of irri-
gation as to that district was experimental, it is arbitrary and
unjust to take a man's property "without affording him any
opportunity to show the insufficiency of that very thing which
forms the basis of the proceedings under which the taking is to
occur." The fact that vast sums of money have been invested
in works constructed in pursuance of this legislation and that mill-
ions of bonds have been issued and sold, and that the validity of
this legislation has been several times sustained by the Supreme
Court of California, "while demanding on the part of this Court
great care and caution in the consideration of the case can not
justify it in failing to declare invalid legislation which, in its
judgment, violates those principles of the United States Consti-
tution'which protects the private property of every person
against forcible talking without due process of law. * * * "
Judge Ross concludes: "Unfortunate as it will be if losses result
to investors, and desirable as it undoubtedly is, in this section of
the country, that irrigation facilities be improved and extended,
it is far more important that the provision of that great charter,
which is the sheet anchor of safety, be in all things observed and
enforced." The demurrer was overruled. [This subject will be
further discussed in an article by W. P. Aiken, Esq., of the New
York bar in the February number of the JOURNAL.]
An interesting question is involved in the recent case of
Schillings v. United States (i55 U. S. 163), as to the liability of
YALE LAW JOURNV4L.
the United States to be sued for the infringement of a patent.
The plaintiff secured a patent for an improvement in the prepara-
tion of concrete pavement. While the patent was still in force,
the United States through its official architect constructed walks
and drives about the Capitol with the patented article without the
plaintiff's permission or without making him any compensation.
The plaintiff brought suit for damages. The Supreme Court of
the United States held that he could not recover on the broad
principle that the Sovereign cannot be sued without his consent
and that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction in an action
against the United States for torts. But the law was stated other-
wise in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. He pro-
ceeds upon the rule that the plaintiff as the injured party had a
right to waive the tort and bring action upon an implied contract.
The proceedings then might properly be submitted before the
Court of Claims. Further, that all claims founded upon the con-
stitution are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and
that this was such a claim, since the Constitution forbids the con-
fiscating of private property for public use without making fair
compensation.
The law governing the relation of railroads and telegraph
companies has just received a most important addition by the
decision of the United States Supreme Court given out on No-
vember 26th, in the case of the Unzited States v. The W4estern
Union and the Union Pacific. The question involved is the
validity of certain contracts between the railroad and the tele-
graph company by which the latter has been given the exclusive
right of way and of telegraphic operation over the lines of the
railroad. The case made its first appearance in the Circuit Court
in Nebraska (50 Fed. Rep. 28), where the Government attacked
these contracts on the ground that the railroad, which owned
its telegraphic franchises by grant from the United States
had failed in its duty to the Government by transferring
its telegraphic obligations to the Western Union. Judge Brewer
upheld the Government's attack, but his decision was reversed by
Judge Thayer in the Circuit Court of Appeals in January, 1894
(59 Fed. Rep. 813). The Government took the case to the
Supreme Court, which has now ruled that these contracts, giving
exclusive rights of operation to one telegraph company, are in-
valid and must be cancelled. The exact ground of this decision
is that these contracts directly conflict with the provisions of the
Post Road Statute of July, 1866, under which any telegraph com-
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pany, which accepts the Act, is given the right to erect its plant
along any post road of the United States, and the term includes
every railroad in the country. Practically all of our telegraph
companies have accepted this statute, so that the ruling is deci-
sive as to the invalidity of all such exclusive contracts between
such companies and the railroads. The question never has been,
and practically never can be, decided wholly independently of this
statute, but there are parts of the present opinion which base the
objections to such contracts on the broader grounds of public
policy, and indicate that the agreements are inherently bad.
Under present conditions this decision necessarily will have the
widest effect on telegraph companies, which have entered into so
many of these agreements, because there is nothing to prevent
the railroads from avoiding these contracts as they see fit. But
the case has a still wider interest as showing what a risky busi-
ness it is for corporations, however powerful they may be, to make
legislation in their own favor. The Post Road Statute was
literally the creation of the Western Union Telegraph Company,
and was thought to bring with it immense gains, to which no
harm could be added. This was done thirty years ago. To-day
this very statute has proved a successful means of destroying
some of the most valuable privileges of the company that framed
it. The moral of this piece of legal history is very plain and not
far to seek.
